

things withouteforth, and medleth the
images of things withouteforth to tho
formes yhidde withinne himself.

prose V.
Quod si in corporibus sentiendis.

What yif that in
bodies to ben feled,
that is to seyn, in the
takinge of knowe-
leche of bodily
things, and albeit
so that the quali-
tees of bodies, that
ben objecte fro with-
oute forth, moeve
& ententen the instruments of the wittes;
and albeit so that the passion of the body,
that is to seyn, the wit or the suffraunce,
goth to form the strengthe of the workinge
corage, the which passion or suffraunce
cepth forth the dede of the thocht in
himself, and moeveth and excitet in this
mene whyle the formes that resten with-
imeforth; and yif that, in sensible bodies,
as I have seyd, our corage nis nat ytaught
or empreint by passion to knowe these
things, but demeth and knoweth, of his
ownestrength, the passion or suffraunce
subject to the body: moche more thanne
the things that ben absolut and quite fro
alle talents or affections of bodies, as God
or his angesles, ne folwen nat in discern-
ing things object fro withoute forth, but
they accomplisshen and speden the dede
of hir thocht. By this resoun thanne ther
comen many maner knowinges to dyverse
and differinge substANCES. For the wit of
the body, the which wit is naked and de-
spoiled of alle other knowinges, thilke wit
comth to beestes that nomen nat moev-
en himself her and ther, as oysters and
muscules, and other swiche shellefish of
the see, that clyven and ben norished to
roches. But the imaginacioun comth to
remuable beestes, that semen to han talent
to flien or to desiden any thing. But resoun
is alonly to the linage of mankinde, right
as intelligence is only to the devyne nature:
of which it folweth, that thilke knowinge
is more worth than thise othere, sin it knowe
eth by his propre nature nat only his sub-
ject, as who seith, if he knoweth nat alonly
that apertieneth properly to his knowinge,
but it knoweth the subjects of alle other
knowinges. But how shal it thanne be, yif
that wit and imaginacioun stryven ayein
resouning, & seyn, that of thilke universel
thing that resoun weneth to seen, that it
nis right naught? For wit & imaginacioun
seyn that that, that is sensible or imagin-
able, it ne may nat be universel. Thanne is
either the judgement of resoun sooth, ne
that ther nis nothing sensible; or elles, for

that resoun wot wel that many thynges ben
subject to wit and to imaginacioun, thanne
is the concepcioun of resoun weyn & false,
which that loketh & comprehendeth that
that is sensible and singular as universe.
And yif that resoun wolde answeren ayein
to thise two, that is to seyn, to witte &
to imaginacioun, and seyn, that soothly she
herself, that is to seyn, resoun, loketh and
comprehendeth, by resoun of universalitee,
bothe that that is sensible & that that
is imaginal; and that thilke two, that is
to seyn, wit and imaginacioun, ne mowen
nat streccen ne enhansen hemself to the
knowinge of universalitee, for that the
knowinge of hem ne may exceden ne sur-
mounte the bodily figures: certes, of the
knowinge of thynges, men oughten rather
even credence to the more stedefast and
to the more parfyt jugement. In this maner
stryvinge thanne, we that han strengthe
of resoninge & of imagininge and of wit,
that is to seyn, by resoun and by imagina-
cioun and by wit, we sholde rather preyse
the cause of resoun; as who seith, than
the cause of wit and of imaginacioun.

EMBLABLE thing is it, that the resoun of mankind ne weneth nat that the deuyne intelligence biholdeth or knoweth thinges to comen, but right as the resoun of mankind knoweth hem. for thou arguest and seyst thus: that yif it ne seme nat to men that some thinges han certain & necessarie bitydinges, they ne mowen nat ben wist bifore certainly to bityden. And thannen is ther no prescience of thilke thinges; and yif we trowe that prescience be in these thinges, thanne is ther nothing that it ne bitydeth by necessite. But certes, yif we mighten han the iugement of the deuyne thought, as we ben parsoneres of resoun, right so as we han demed that it behoveth that imaginacioun and wit be binethe resoun, right so wolde we demen that it were rightful thing, that mannes resoun oughte to submitten itself and to ben binethe the diuyne thought, for which, yif that we mowen, as who seith, that, yif that we mowen, I counseyle, that we enhanse us into the heichte of thilke sovereyn intelligence; for ther shal resoun wel seen that, that it ne may nat biholden in itself. And certes that is this, in what maner the prescience of God seeth alle thinges certins and diffinissed, althogh they ne han no certin issues or bitydinges; ne this is non opinioun, but it is rather the simplicitie of the sovereyn science, that nis nat enclosed nor ysset within none boundes.